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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance
of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) provides in pertinent part:
(2)

Prohibited acts B—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and
intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order or directly from a
partitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this subsection.

(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I
or II (cocaine) . . . is guilty of a third
degree felony.

iv

(e) Any person who violates Subsection
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i),
(ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 .5 (1982) provides:
77- 7 15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop
any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in,, the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
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STATEMENT 01 THE ISSUES
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W h e n did i :;•-» otiricer initiate the encounter with Appellant?

Were the constitutional rights of Appellant violated when
the officer, who still possessed no reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, requested Appellant's identification even though he had
already recognized Appellant by name on sight?
Did the officer act unreasonably in failing to recognize
more prudent alternative means of investigation?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), -8(2)(b)(ii) (Supp.
1989) (effective until July 1, 1990), and Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), -8(2)(e) (Supp. 1989) (effective until July 1,
1990).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 24, 1989, Officer Jed Hurst observed Appellant LeRoy
Raymond Jackson driving his car in a "normal" and appropriate
manner, westbound on 17th South through the Main Street intersection
Transcript of Trial Proceedings (July 11, 1989), First Sentencing
Proceeding (August 14, 1989) and Second Sentencing Proceeding
(October 2, 1989) (hereinafter collectively referred to as "T") at
6, 22. Officer Hurst's testimony revealed that "[e]verything seemed
up to date and normal about [Jackson's] vehicle when [Hurst] first
saw it driving" (T. 22). Hurst, on duty at the time and driving
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to look like" (MS, 35). He did not even know if any arrests had
been made (MS. 22). At the time he observed Jackson's vehicle,
Hurst was investigating neither the Postal Shop robbery nor any
other specific crime in the area (MS 22). Hurst relied solely on
his sketchy recollection of the newspaper article.
When Jackson pulled into the parking lot, "[Hurst] followed
the car into the parking lot . . . ." (MS. 17). "[Hurst] stayed up
by the driveway into the parking lot because as soon as [Jackson's
car pulled to the east end of the parking lot and] stopped, it went
into reverse, came back out, did sort of a half circle turn, and
pulled straight back into another parking stall on the north side of
the parking lot.

(MS. 17, 23); (T. 7-8). Hurst "didn't know

whether [Jackson's car] was going to leave the parking lot or what
it was going to do." (MS. 17-18).

Hurst waited in the driveway

"until [Jackson] maneuvered into a different parking stall than he
had initially pulled into." (MS. 23).
According to Officer Hurst, after Jackson stopped, Hurst
"pulled [his patrol] car up behind [Jackson's] car," (MS. 23),
blocking his access out of the lot (T. 51). "As soon as [Jackson]
exited [his car, Hurst] stopped [his] car." (T. 9 ) ; (MS. 23).
Jackson "got out and came back, back towards [Hurst's patrol] car.
At that time [Hurst] got out of [his] car and walked up towards
[Jackson]." (MS. 18). There was no one else in Jackson's car
(MS. 18).
Based on these facts, the trial court ruled, "[a]t the time
the officer pulled in back of the automobile there was no
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articulable suspicion of criminal activity on defendant's part."
(MS. 48).
Since there was a fence in front of Jackson's car and no
room to maneuver past the police car, Hurst, who could have parked
in the empty parking spaces on either side of Jackson's car, had
intentionally blocked the car (MS. 23-24).

Hurst admitted that he

"had no reason to stop [Jackson]" in the parking lot (T. 27). No
overhead lights or signals were used (T. 8)
there was in fact a block:

The court ruled that

"[t]he police officer [Hurst] upon

stopping [his patrol car], however, did block [Jackson's]
automobile, and for me [the court] to find otherwise, frankly, would
be intellectually dishonest" (T. 51). The court discredited the
trial testimony of Officer Hurst whose recollection of the blocking
issue had conveniently improved after he adopted the version of
another officer who had told him, prior to trial, that Jackson had
enough room to maneuver past the parked patrol car (T. 52).
When Hurst encountered Jackson, Hurst "recognized him as
being Mr. Jackson, but [Hurst] couldn't remember what his first name
was" (MS. 24). Despite the immediate recognition Hurst continued,
asking Appellant if "he was Mr. Jackson" (T. 17). Appellant
correctly responded, "I am Mr. Jackson" (T. 18).
Intruding further, Hurst asked, "[d]o you have any
identification?" (T. 18). Jackson responded by giving the officer a
Checkmart identification card (T. 18); (MS. 24). The card contained
Appellant's picture and the name, LeRoy Jackson, on it (T. 10, 11,
18, 19). Hurst testified that Appellant "looked the same as the

picture on the card" and "knew Appellant was Mr. Jackson" (T. 19).
Yet Hurst was still not satisfied.

Though fully aware of

Jackson's identity, Hurst asked Jackson for his driver's license
"[t]o verify who he was and see if he was driving legally or not"
(T. 20). Hurst reasoned, "I wanted to get some good identification
from the State," (T. 20), because Jackson "was driving a car,"
(MS. 25), and "Checkmart I.D's are not good I.D." (MS. 25);
(T. 27). However, Hurst did admit that he had no "reason to believe
that [Jackson's] Checkmart I.D. was false" (MS. 25).
At the time Hurst asked Jackson for his driver's license,
Hurst "knew nothing more about [Jackson] than a suspicion [Hurst]
had from reading the Sunday [Deseret News] paper" (MS. 26). Hurst
nonetheless maintained his investigative focus on Jackson.

If

Jackson had attempted to walk away without answering him, Hurst
"would have demanded a drivers license" (T. 27).
Instead, Jackson simply admitted that he didn't have his
license (MS. 26). Unable to "remember if [Jackson] gave [Hurst] a
reason, or not, as to why [the license] was taken away," (MS. 27),
Hurst continued his questioning in apparent pursuit of his second
admitted purpose: "to find out who the car belonged to" (T. 21).
Hurst did not "ask [Jackson] what he was doing there or where he was
going" (T. 18).
Officer Hurst then asked Jackson for his car registration
(MS. 27). Jackson's explanation, again not "remember[ed] exactly"
by Hurst, was not incriminating and would not "have changed
[Hurst's] investigation" or led him to believe that Jackson had
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stolen the car (MS. 27-28).

It appears that Jackson may have

purchased the car from someone who still had the registration
(MS. 27).
The detention was prolonged further as Hurst required
Jackson to wait for a computer check on the license plate (T. 28).
However, "[a]t the time [Hurst first] saw the vehicle, there was
nothing about [the] license plate that would [have given Hurst] a
clue that it was a stolen plate" (T. 22). Hurst radioed dispatch to
verify Jackson's registration and driver's license. (MS. 28);
(T. 12). Dispatch informed Hurst that the license plate on the car
had been stolen and Jackson's driver's license was suspended
(T. 12). Hurst considered releasing Jackson with a citation but
ultimately determined that his lack of "good State identification,"
(MS. 37), required an arrest (T. 13).
Hurst handcuffed and arrested Jackson for possession of
stolen property and driving with a suspended driver's license
(MS. 30); (T. 28). Hurst then frisked Jackson for weapons and
contraband (T. 29). Nothing was found (T. 30).
By this time, another officer had arrived on the scene.
Officer Cracroft conducted an inventory of Jackson's car while
Officer Hurst, seated beside Jackson in the patrol car, called a
"wrecker" to impound Appellant's car (T. 13); (MS. 30). The
officers did not ask Jackson about the contents of the car or
whether he had left any personal items therein (MS. 34). In
addition, Hurst could not see what Cracroft did inside of Jackson's
car during the search (MS. 30-31).
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The officers did, however, ask Jackson about a pill vial
Cracroft allegedly found in the car (MS. 31). Officer Hurst opened
the vial; looked at the contents, "a white powdered substance,"; and
showed it to Jackson.

(MS. 31). Without informing Appellant of his

Miranda rights, Hurst continued questioning him (MS. 32).
Mr. Jackson7s statements were suppressed by the trial court because
of Officer Hurst's unconstitutional inquiry (MS. 50).
The entire detention lasted half an hour (T. 13, 28). The
officers took Jackson to the county jail where he was admitted and
searched by a correctional officer, Billy Ray Romero (T. 32).
Mr. Romero found two tinfoil packages and a "rolled joint of
marijuana" on Appellant's person (T. 34).
The proffered testimony of two of the State's witnesses
would have indicated that the substances, State's Exhibits 1 and 2,
were placed in the evidence room and analyzed by the State Crime Lab
(T. 37). Appellant stipulated to the chain of custody and drug
analysis (T. 37). The lab technician would have identified the
tinfoil exhibits as cocaine and the rolled "joint" as "crushed
marijuana and cocaine residue" (T. 37).
In a Motion to Suppress before the Honorable Michael R.
Murphy, Appellant Jackson moved to suppress the cocaine seized from
his vehicle and the substances found on his person as fruits of an
illegal stop (Record 33); (MS. 2, 6, 7). Judge Murphy denied
Appellant's motion to suppress the substances (MS. 51). Appellant
also argued that the officers conducted an improper inventory search
though the State consequently stipulated "to the non-admissibility

- 8

of the evidence regarding this inventory search" (MS. 7).
In the subsequent bench trial before Judge Murphy, the
court ruled that "there [was] no articulable suspicion to stop the
defendant [Jackson] prior to the time that the officer indicated
that he had placed the defendant under arrest"; the defendant
voluntarily "exited his car and approached the police car on foot
before the police car stopped"; the officer "did block the
automobile"; the officer reasonably expected "an identification
initially in the form of a drivers license . . . given his problems
with Checkmart identifications"; "[u]p to that point there had been
no stop • . . because a reasonable person in the defendant's
position . . . would have believed he was still free to leave. Upon
defendant's statement that he had no drivers license, a reasonable
suspicion arose that [Jackson had committed the crime of] driving
without a license . . . And therefore, at that time there was a
basis for a stop . . . and only thereafter did a stop occur."
(T. 51-53).
The court found Appellant Jackson guilty of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree
felony, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana), a class B misdemeanor.

A third count (receiving stolen

property [the license plate]) had been previously dismissed.
(T. 55-56).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Officer Jed Hurst "seized11 Appellant LeRoy Raymond Jackson
when he parked his patrol car directly behind Mr. Jackson's car.
The officer had no legal justification for blocking Mr. Jackson's
car.

The officer's appearance and conduct led Mr. Jackson to leave

his car; Mr. Jackson did not voluntary approach and talk to Officer
Hurst.

Their encounter was not a casual consensual meeting free of

fourth amendment guarantees.
Despite his recognition of Appellant by name, Officer Hurst
unlawfully and repeatedly requested identification from
Mr. Jackson.

This conduct again constituted a seizure unsupported

by the requisite "reasonable articulable suspicion."
Mr. Jackson was driving normally down the street just prior
to his encounter with Officer Hurst.

Only after "fishing" for some

sign of wrongdoing did Officer Hurst discover that Mr. Jackson was
driving with a suspended license.

Officer Hurst, in pursuit of his

objective to identify Mr. Jackson, should have followed a less
intimidating course of conduct than blocking, seizing, and
unnecessarily questioning Mr. Jackson.

The subsequent discovery of

controlled substances on Mr. Jackson's person should have been
suppressed as "fruits" of an illegal seizure.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
OFFICER HURST "SEIZED" APPELLANT BY BLOCKING HIS CAR.
In State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court acknowledged "three levels of police encounters with
the public which . . . are constitutionally permissible."

Id. at

617.
(1)

An officer may approach a citizen at any time
and pose questions so long as the citizen is
not detained against his will;

(2)

An officer may seize a person if the officer
has a "reasonable suspicion" that the person
has committed or is about to commit a crime;
however, the "detention must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop";

(3)

An officer may arrest a suspect if the officer
has probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed or is being committed.

Id. at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230
(5th Cir. 1984)); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982) (reasonable
suspicion standard required for questioning).

If a police encounter

does not fall within a "level one" encounter, the individual may
invoke the fourth amendment which "provides that people have the
right to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches
and seizures."

State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987);

U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Utah Const. Art. I, § 14..
In the police encounter, here, between Officer Jed Hurst
and Appellant LeRoy Raymond Jackson, the initial determination is

whether a seizure occurred.

"A fourth amendment analysis of police

officer conduct is fact sensitive; thus [appellate courts] review
the facts in detail."

State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App.

1989).

A.

OFFICER HURST BLOCKED AND SEIZED APPELLANT'S
CAR WITHOUT A REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY.

"The simple language of the [Fourth] Amendment applies
equally to seizures of persons and to seizures of property."
Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).

Officer Hurst blocked

and seized Mr. Jackson's car which, in turn, constituted a seizure
of Mr. Jackson's person.

State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah App.

1989), lends authoritative guidance in this regard.
In Smith, a case similar to the instant action, this Court
considered, inter alia, whether defendant Jerome Smith was "seized"
by an officer who had followed Smith's car into a parking lot,
waited for him to stop, and then "stopped [the patrol] car behind
defendant's car, blocking the car." Id. at 880. The officer
testified that he followed Smith's vehicle because it turned without
signaling.

Id. at 880.

"The State [in Smith] contended defendant [Smith]
voluntarily pulled into the parking lot and parked his car and thus
no fourth amendment stop had occurred."

Id. at 880.

"The trial

court, focusing on defendant's initial parking of his car,
[similarly found] that there was no stop because the defendant
[Smith] voluntarily pulled into the parking lot."
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Id.

The

appellate court disagreed, finding the trial court's "inquiry was
too narrow" Id. at 881.
Characterization of the encounter between [the]
Officer . . . and defendant [Smith] must be
determined by examining the totality of the
circumstances . . . We also must consider whether
defendant "remain[ed], not in the spirit of
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but
because he believ[ed] he [was] not free to
leave . . . ."
Smith, 781 P.2d at 881 (citations omitted).
Like the defendant in Smith, Appellant Jackson believed
that he was not free to leave.

If Jackson had initially possessed

the "spirit of cooperation," the officer's intimidating conduct
quickly turned his mood into a fear of non-cooperation.
Officer Hurst had suddenly made a U-turn in the middle of a
main thoroughfare to follow Jackson, despite the fact that Jackson
had not committed a traffic violation (T. 7, 27). When Jackson
pulled into the parking lot, "[Hurst] followed [Jackson's] car into
the parking lot . . . ." (MS. 17). "[Hurst] stayed up by the
driveway into the parking lot because as soon as [Jackson's car
pulled to the east end of the parking lot and] stopped, it went into
reverse, came back out, did sort of a half circle turn, and pulled
straight back into another parking stall on the north side of the
parking lot.

(MS. 17, 23); (T. 7-8). Hurst "didn't know whether

[Jackson's car] was going to leave the parking lot or what it was
going to do." (MS. 17-18).

Hurst waited in the driveway "until

[Jackson] maneuvered into a different parking stall than he had
initially pulled into." (MS. 23).

-
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If Jackson had not already seen Officer Hurst7s car
following him, he clearly saw the police car when he parked.
Jackson went forward to the east, looked behind him to the west
whereupon he "backed up, sort of a half U-turn11 (T. 8) into the
other stall on the north side (MS. 18). The front of his car faced
south.

Hurst's police car was clearly visible to Jackson during at

least one point of the maneuvering.
Being the driver, (MS. 18), Jackson could see everything in
front of him.

According to Officer Hurst, after Jackson stopped,

Hurst "pulled [his patrol] car up behind [Jackson's] car," (MS. 23),
blocking his access out of the lot (T. 51). "As soon as [Jackson]
exited [his car, Hurst] stopped [his] car." (T. 9 ) ; (MS. 23).
Jackson "got out and came back, back towards [Hurst's patrol] car.
At that time [Hurst] got out of [his] car and walked up towards
[Jackson]." (MS. 18). There was no one else in Jackson's car
(MS. 18).
The trial court focused entirely on Jackson's decision to
exit the car rather than the officer's appearance and conduct which
precipitated it. Although the court did not have the benefit of
reviewing the recent decision of State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah
App. 1989), the trial court clearly erred by not following the
principles of the other submitted decisions.

See e.g., People v.

Guy, 121 Mich. App. 592, 329 N.W.2d 435 (1982), and United States v.
Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987).

Kerr is especially compelling.

In Kerr, a deputy observed defendant Duane Kerr loading
boxes into a vehicle parked in a neighborhood beset with a rash of
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recent burglaries.

Id. at 1385, 1387. The deputy made a U-turn and

turned into the driveway where Kerr was located.

Id. at 1385. Kerr

"was backing his car out" when he "left his own car and met [the]
Deputy . . . on foot."

Id.

As held by the Court:

Kerr stopped and exited his car primarily in
response to [the Deputy's] official appearance and
conduct, rather than of his own volition. Arriving
in uniform and in a marked partrol car, [the Deputy]
unquestionably appeared to be acting in an official
capacity. Instead of waiting in his patrol car at
the roadside, or parking and walking, [the Deputy]
pulled into and blocked the one lane driveway as
Kerr was backing out. [The Deputy's] conduct thus
precipitated the confrontation with Kerr. . . Under
the circumstances, [the Deputy's] authority and
conduct provided Kerr with no reasonable alternative
except an encounter with the police. Consequently,
the encounter cannot be deemed voluntary.
Id. at 1386-87.
Similarly, instead of waiting in the driveway, or parking
in one of the available empty parking spaces and walking up to
Appellant, Officer Hurst, arriving in uniform and driving a marked
patrol car, blocked Jackson's only access out of the parking lot.
There were other exits but the close proximity of Hurst's car to
Jackson's vehicle eliminated Jackson's ability to leave. Moreover,
as inferred by Kerr, the fact that both defendant Kerr and Appellant
Jackson left their respective cars does not evidence consent or
voluntariness.
The Smith court recognized the likelihood of such police
initiated stops even when the defendant actually "stops" first:
Other jurisdictions have held that when an officer
blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment has occurred even
though the original stop was not initiated by the
officer.
- 15 -

Smith, 781 P.2d at 882 n.3 (emphasis added).

The Smith court

acknowledged applicable case law from other jurisdictions which held
that a seizure occurs when a defendant's car is blocked by a
policeman's vehicle.
In People v. Guv, 121 Mich. App. 592, 329 N.W.2d 435
(1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
Although the initial stop of the
Continental in the driveway was not the
result of Officer Hattis' actions, his
partial blockage of the driveway and
subsequent visit to the Continental
clearly constituted a detention of the
automobile and would be the equivalent of
a police-initiated "stop."
Id. at 440.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1987),
scrutinized a similar "blocking" encounter and found
it was a seizure. The court, in finding a seizure
had occurred, noted that it was not possible for the
defendant to drive around the officer's patrol car:
"[He] stopped and exited his car primarily in
response to deputy Hendrick's official appearance
and conduct rather than of his own volition." Id.
at 1386 See also United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d
179, 182 (5th Cir. 1988).
Smith, 781 P.2d at 882 n.3.

The noted authority eviscerates the

trial court's focus on Appellant Jackson's initial parking of the
car and on the finding that there was no stop.
At the time the officer pulled in back of [Jackson's
car] there was no articulable suspicion of criminal
activity on defendant's part. There was, however,
at that time no stop. The officer was free to pull
up where he wished in the parking lot. It is true
that the defendant could not pull the car away.
However, the defendant was free to walk
wherever he wanted. [Instead] of walking on either
side of the car . . . to the bar, he chose [instead,
voluntarily] to approach the officer. The officer
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then engaged him in conversation, asking for
identification. Still no stop.
(MS. 48-49).

The court's reasoning is troublesome.

Despite citing the totality of the circumstances" standard,
the court quickly dismissed the precipitating conduct of Officer
Hurst:

"a reasonable person in Mr. Jackson's position should have

believed that he was free to leave notwithstanding the fact that the
vehicle was blocked" (T. 53). The court clearly erred in its
decision thus mandating reversal.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191

(Utah 1987).
The very fact that Appellant's vehicle was blocked
unquestionably restrained Jackson's freedom to leave the area.
While it may be true that Officer Hurst was free to pull up wherever
he wished, the fact that his chosen parking spot blocked Jackson's
access out of the parking lot turned the entire encounter into a
seizure.

A fence blocked one side of Jackson's car and Officer

Hurst's car blocked the other (MS. 23). The initial seizure of the
car is not negated by Jackson's "freedom" to walk wherever he
wanted.

More specifically,
Blocking a citizen's path or impeding his progress
is an indicator that a seizure has occurred.
Similarly, retaining his ticket or identification
may indicate a seizure if his freedom is thereby
restrained. An officer's statement that the
individual is the focus of an investigation or that
a truly innocent person would cooperate with police
tends to indicate lack of consent and therefore a
seizure.

United States v. Pualisi, 723 F.2d 779, 783 (11th Cir. 1984).

A

driver would have no other choice but to approach the officer and
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ask, defensively, "Did I do something wrong?"; "Why did you follow
me?"; or "Why is my car being blocked?"
Officer Hurst testified that his admitted purpose in
following Jackson was "to find out who [the suspect] was," (T. 21),
believing improperly that Jackson's car was connected to the
reported robbery (T. 2 0-21).

There were no other people in

Jackson's car, (MS. 18), and Officer Hurst was not investigating any
other matters at the time (MS. 22). If Jackson had attempted to
walk away without answering any questions, Hurst "would have
demanded a drivers license" (T. 27).
Jackson was undoubtedly the focus of Hurst's investigation.
Jackson's desire to drive depended entirely on the withdrawal of the
police car.

In addition, Hurst initiated the conversation by asking

for identification (MS. 24). Hurst asked all the questions, placing
Jackson in a defensive posture.

Consequently, Jackson's decision to

approach the officer cannot be considered voluntary.
As indicated earlier by the authority in Smith,1 "when an
officer blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure . . . has occurred
even though the original stop was not initiated by the officer."
Smith, 781 P.2d at 882 n.3.

Even if Jackson did stop his car and

1

The Smith court ultimately found that the stop was
constitutional even though the police seized Smith's car by parking
behind him because it was incident to a lawful citation for a
traffic violation. Smith, 781 P.2d at 85. By comparison, Officer
Hurst's unconstitutional conduct was even more egregious than the
officer in Smith, since Hurst conceded that he had no basis for the
stop and Jackson was free to leave. At least the officer in Smith
observed a traffic violation before he blocked defendant Smith's car.
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approached the officer first, his actions were a direct consequence
of the blockage.
stop.

In reality the encounter was a police-initiated

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) ("In

view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave").

The

illegal seizure renders inadmissible the subsequent discovery of
controlled substances found on Appellant Jackson's person.

Cf.

State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471.

B.

OFFICER HURST'S APPEARANCE AND CONDUCT
CONSTITUTED A SHOW OF AUTHORITY

"A seizure . . . occurs only when the officer by means of
physical force or show of authority has in some way restricted the
liberty of a person."
1987).

State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App.

Officer Hurst could not have chosen a better way of showing

his authority than by parking directly behind Jackson's car when
there were empty parking spaces on either side of the car.

The

car's pathway was blocked, Jackson's exit was impeded, and his
freedom was restrained.
A case factually similar to the case at bar, State v.
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), illustrates that before officers
can exhibit even the slightest bit of authority, they must first
have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

In Swanigan,

Officer Young, in response to a reported burglary, noticed two
individuals walking along the road in the vicinity of the
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burglarized home. Id. at 719.

Young called dispatch, requested an

"attempt to locate" broadcast of the two individuals, and continued
towards the home. Id.

Approximately two hours later, Officer

Bithell observed defendant Swanigan and a companion walking "some
three blocks" away from the home.

"Bithell ordered the two to stop

and then asked for identification. Id.

The officers subsequently

learned, through a warrants check on the two individuals, that one
party had an outstanding warrant.

Both men were arrested. Id.

During the accompanying pat-down, the officer recovered some of the
property stolen from the burglarized home. Id.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held, "the stop was based
on a mere hunch rather than the constitutionally mandated
'reasonable suspicion'; consequently, the confiscated evidence was
erroneously admitted at trial." Swanigan. 699 P.2d at 719.

The

facts of Swanigan are essentially identical to the facts in the
present case.
Officer Bithell stopped defendant Swanigan and requested
identification on a mere hunch.

Similarly, Officer Hurst blocked

Appellant Jackson's car and requested identification without having
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

The authority

exhibited by Officer Bithell in ordering defendant Swanigan to stop
is functionally equivalent to the authority exhibited by Officer
Hurst in blocking Appellant Jackson's car. £f. State v. Truiillo,
739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987).
The officers conduct in both cases was a clear show of
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authority.2
cars.

Both officers appeared in uniform and marked patrol

Both officers acted prematurely, relying on second hand

authority rather than directly observing criminal activity.

Both

officers, knowing that they have no legitimate grounds to pursue
their investigation further, detained the "suspects" by asking for
identification. See infra Point II, page 3-\ . "Fishing" for a sign
of wrongdoing, both officers "caught" the suspects for their past
misdeeds, albeit unconnected to the investigation.

Now armed with

"reasonable suspicion" both officers frisked and ultimately found
suppressible evidence.
As the Swanigan Court held unlawful the conduct of Officer
Bithell, Appellant Jackson respectfully requests that this Court
hold unlawful the improper conduct of Officer Hurst.

POINT II
OFFICER HURST "SEIZED" APPELLANT BY REQUIRING
IDENTIFICATION.
Assuming, arguendo, that Officer Hurst did not seize
Jackson by blocking his car, Hurst, who had no reasonable suspicion
to continue his investigation, subsequently seized Jackson7s person

2

Two additional factors are important: time and
location. Lacking further justification for his unlawful conduct,
Officer Hurst, unlike Officer Bithell, had neither the immediacy of
the situation, nor the geographic closeness of the situation in his
favor. Officer Bithell acted on 'a recent two hour police bulletin;
Officer Hurst acted on an outdated four day old newspaper article
(T. 6-7). Officer Bithell stopped the suspects three blocks away
from the scene of a just reported crime; Officer Hurst stopped a
suspect near 17th South and Main, no where near the Ninth South and
150 East location of the Postal Shop robbery (T. 6-7).

?i
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by asking for identification.

Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982).

"A person may not be detained and required to identify himself."
Commonwealth v. Holloway, 384 S.E.2d 99, 102 (Va. App. 1989).
Although Appellant recognizes that not all police questioning of
citizens implicates the fourth amendment, Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S.
491, 497-98 (1983), "when [officers detain a suspect] for the
purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they [perform] a
seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the fourth
amendment."

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979).

In Brown, two officers observed Zachary Brown in an alley
walking away from another man in a "high drug problem area."

Brown,

443 U.S. at 48. The "officers did not claim to suspect [Brown] of
any specific misconduct . . . but still "asked [him] to identify
himself and explain what he was doing there."

Id.

According to the

officers, "the situation looked suspicious and we had never seen
[Brown] in that area before.7"

Id.

Brown, after refusing to

identify himself, was arrested for refusing to give his name and
address to an officer in violation of a Texas statute.

Id.

(citation omitted).
The Texas courts convicted Brown but the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding "appellant may not be punished for
refusing to identify himself."

Brown, 443 U.S. at 53.

"[T]he Texas

statute [was] . . . designed to advance a weighty social
objective . . . : prevention of crime."

The Supreme Court reasoned,

But even assuming that purpose is served to some
degree by stopping and demanding identification from
an individual without any specific basis for
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believing he is involved in criminal activity, the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it.
When such a stop is not based on objective criteria,
the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices
exceeds tolerable limits.
Brown, 443 U.S. at 53.
Like the officer in Brown, id. at 52, Officer Hurst
acknowledged that the reason for stopping Jackson was to ascertain
his identity (T. 21). But, unlike the officers in Brown, Officer
Hurst had ascertained Jackson's identity at the outset of the
"encounter."

Once both parties exited their vehicles, Hurst saw

Jackson and "recognized him as being Mr. Jackson, but . . . couldn't
remember what his first name was" (MS. 24); (T. 17). Hurst
nonetheless asked Appellant if he was Mr. Jackson (T. 17).
Appellant responded, "I am Mr. Jackson" (T. 18). Hurst thus
ascertained Jackson's name on sight and then received oral
confirmation (T. 18). His purpose, "to know any possible suspect's
name," (T. 21) was now satisfied.

The protections of Brown apply

with even greater force to Officer Hurst, who already knew Jackson's
identity.

Hurst should have moved on.
Instead, Hurst, who had just confirmed Appellant's

identity, intruded further by asking, "Do you have any
identification?" (T. 18). Jackson responded by giving the officer a
Checkmart identification card (T. 18); (MS. 24). The card contained
Appellant's picture and the name, LeRoy Jackson, on it (T. 10, 11,
18, 19). Hurst acknowledged that Appellant "looked the same as the
picture on the card" and "knew Appellant was Mr. Jackson" (T. 19).
Again, Hurst's purpose was fulfilled.

- o-\

-

Yet, Hurst was still not satisfied.

He then asked Jackson

for his driver's license (MS. 24, 25); (T. 20). Hurst testified
that he wanted "some good identification from the State" (T. 20),
because Jackson "was driving a car" and "Checkmart identifications
are often false" (MS. 25). The trial court held that the officers
conduct was reasonable:
It was reasonable that the police officer would
expect an identification initially in the form of a
driver's license, and therefore, it was reasonable
for him to ask for a driver's license, given his
problems with Checkmart identifications.
(T. 52). The trial court erred in this determination.
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) would
prohibit such intrusions, at least by analogy, when the officer's
conduct exceeds the legitimate scope of his objectives.

In

Schlosser, an officer pulled a car over for speeding. Id. at 1133.
Suspicious of the passenger's movements in the car and their
apparent attempts to hide something, the officer opened the
passenger door of the stopped vehicle. Id. at 1134. Although the
initial stop may have been lawful, Justice Stewart, after citing a
recent United States Supreme Court decision, recognized "that even a
small intrusion beyond the legitimate scope of an initially lawful
search is unlawful under the Fourth Amendment."
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).

Id. at 1135 (citing

"The officer's 'clear

initial objective' in opening the car door was to see whether [the
defendant] was 'hiding something'

However, without probable cause

to justify it, that act clearly exceeded the lawful scope of a
legitimate governmental interest."

Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135-36.
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By analogy, Officer Hurst's "clear initial objective" in
following, blocking and questioning Appellant Jackson was "[t]o find
out who he was." (T. 21). Assuming, arguendo, that the initial
block was not unlawful and the resulting encounter was in fact
consensual, Officer Hurst, with neither probable cause nor
reasonable suspicion to justify his requests for "any
identification," clearly exceeded the lawful scope of his
investigation when he had already recognized Appellant by name on
sight.

Cf. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah App. 1988)

(citations omitted) ("Anything less [than a reasonable suspicion or
probable cause] would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches, a result [the United States Supreme Court] has
consistently refused to sanction").
If Officer Hurst's conduct in asking Appellant, "if he was
Mr. Jackson?" was proper, (T. 17), once Appellant replied, "I am
Mr. Jackson," (T. 18), Officer Hurst should have stopped his
questioning.

A "small intrusion" occurred when Hurst asked

generally for "any identification." (T. 18); (MS. 24). A
substantial intrusion then occurred when Hurst asked for the
driver's license (MS. 25); (T. 19).
Officer Hurst specifically admitted that, at the time he
requested Jackson's driver's license, Hurst had no reason "to
believe that Jackson's Checkmart I.D. was false" (MS. 25). Even if
Hurst had experienced problems with Checkmart identification cards,
that fact would not apply here because Hurst recognized Jackson on

sight; Jackson correctly stated his name, thereby confirming Hurst's
initial recognition; and Hurst knew the Checkmart identification
card also corroborated Jackson's identity (MS, 24); (T. 17-19).
Hurst's testimony that he asked for Jackson's driver's license
because "[h]e was driving a car" (MS. 25) is completely improper.
Jackson had not committed a traffic violation.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

Cf. Delaware v.

Hurst even admitted that "he had no

reason to stop [Jackson]" (T. 27).
The court's reasoning is also flawed:

"upon defendant's

statement that he had no driver's license, a reasonable suspicion
arose that a crime or infraction had been committed, that is,
driving without a license, and the defendant had committed that
crime or infraction" (T. 52). The trial court clearly erred because
the officer's reasonable suspicion arose only in hindsight and not
at the time when the defendant was driving in a "normal" and
appropriate manner down the street.

Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (except in those situations in which there is
at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is
unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either
the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for
violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in
order to check his driver's license and the registration of the
automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment").
Hurst's second admitted purpose in following Mr. Jackson
was "to find out who the car belonged to" (T. 21), but Hurst, again,
could not articulate a reasonable basis for such an inquiry.

- 26 -

As

noted above, the request for Jackson's driver's license and
registration was improper.
Officer Hurst's subsequent finding that Jackson was driving
with a suspended license resulted from an unfounded suspicion.

All

the substances found on Mr. Jackson were the result of an illegal
seizure.

The trial court clearly erred in denying Appellant's

Motion to Suppress the substances.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191

(Utah 1987).

POINT III
THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE NEED FOR AN INVESTIGATION.
Not only did Officer Hurst illegally seize Appellant
Jackson's car and unlawfully request his identification, Hurst also
unreasonably detained Jackson to investigate an already completed
crime.
The factors . . . may be somewhat different when the
stop to investigate past criminal activity is
involved rather than the stop to investigate ongoing
criminal conduct. This is because the governmental
interests and the nature of the intrusions involved
in the two situations may differ. As we noted in
Terry, the general interests present in the context
of ongoing or imminent criminal activity is "that of
effective crime prevention and detention.11 A stop
to investigate an already completed crime does not
necessarily promote the interest of crime prevention
as directly as a stop to investigate suspected
ongoing criminal activity. Similarly, the exigent
circumstances which require a police officer to step
in before a crime is committed or completed are not
necessarily as pressing long afterwards. Public
safety may be less threatened by a suspect in a past
crime who now appears to be going about his lawful
business than it is by a suspect who is currently in
the process of violating the law. Finally, officers
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making the stop to investigate past crimes may have
a wider range of opportunities to choose the time
and circumstances of the stop.
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1985) (citations
omitted).
The Hensley court then qualified their statements.
Officers may detain a suspect "if police have a reasonable
suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person
they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a
completed felony.

Id. at 229.

Clearly, such a detention would not

apply here when the trial court expressly held, H[a]t the time the
officer [Hurst] pulled in back of the automobile there was no
articulable suspicion of criminal activity on defendant's [Jackson]
part" (MS. 48); (T. 51). Officer Hurst should have acquired more
information before he acted.
In addition, as noted by the court in Anderson v. State,
387 A.2d 281 (Md. App. 1978), in its discussion of the reasonable
suspicion standard:
The rationale underlying Terry is hardly so potent
where, as here the crime is six days old and there
is no perceptible reason why further surveillance
and investigation could not be undertaken, rather
than immediately precipitating a street encounter
with its concomitant danger to the officers and
intrusion upon the personal security of citizens.
Id. at 284. Obviously, if police action cannot be justified under
the higher standard of Terry, Officer Hurst's unfounded suspicions
cannot justify an unreasonable confrontation of a crime at least
four days old, assuming the newspaper reported the robbery a day
after it occurred.
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Nothing in Appellant Jackson's circumstances required
Officer Hurst's immediate attention.

The lack of immediacy is one

of many factors distinguishing the present case from the somewhat
related cases of State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987); Layton
Citv v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied 765 P.2d
1277 (1987); and Bountiful Citv v. Maestas, No. 890054-CA (Utah App.
March 8, 1990).
In Deitman. police officers had just responded to a burglar
alarm.

"[A]rriving at the scene," the officers observed a truck

pull away from the curb across the street from the shop. Id. at
617.

The officers followed the truck until it stopped on the other

side of the street.

Then, an "officer called to defendants and

asked if he could speak to them." Id.
In contrast, Officer Hurst observed Jackson's car more than
four days after the robbery had actually occurred.

Moreover, the

officers in Deitman followed but did not block the defendant's
truck.

Officer Hurst blocked Appellant's car.

The officers in

Deitman first asked if he could speak to the suspects.
request was made by Officer Hurst.

The officers in Deitman did not

recognize or know the suspected individuals.
recognize Appellant on sight.
level one encounter.

No such

Officer Hurst

The facts of Deitman constituted a

Appellant Jackson was involved in a level two

confrontation.
In Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1987),
an officer followed and parked behind defendant James Bennett's
truck.

There is no indication that the officer blocked the truck.
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Bennett walked up to the police car and "freely initiated a
conversation." Id. at 966. Appellant Jackson, having just been
blocked by Officer Hurst, did not initiate a conversation, nor does
the record reflect that Jackson asked even one question during the
encounter.
The officer in Layton City "detected a strong odor of
alcohol" coming from Bennett, id. at 967, whereas in the case at
bar, Officer Hurst detected nothing incriminating from the conduct,
comments, or appearance of Appellant Jackson.

The officer in Lavton

City also had an arguably immediate need to detain the intoxicated
Bennett.

Appellant Jackson never was or appeared intoxicated.

He

posed no threat to the public and Officer Hurst improperly detained
Jackson after his identity was corroborated by the identification
card.
In Bountiful City v. Maestas, No. 890054-CA (Utah App.
March 8, 1990), an officer was issuing a traffic ticket when two
citizens informed him about an apparently intoxicated person in a
vehicle near a State Liquor Store.

After completing the traffic

stop, the officer spotted the vehicle described by the citizens in
the liquor store parking lot.

The officer pulled alongside

defendant Luis Maestas' car, made initial contact, and received
Maestas' driver's license.
The level one encounter of Maestas is not controlling
here.

The officer in Maestas knew what the vehicle looked like,

unlike Officer Hurst, who "wasn't sure . . . [if] it matched or
not." (MS. 17). The officer in Maestas responded promptly, driving
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to the nearby liquor store where the suspect was reportedly
situated.

Officer Hurst's response was untimely.

Maestas properly pursued one individual.

The officer in

Officer Hurst followed one

suspect in a car which may or may not have been the same vehicle
which reportedly contained four individuals.

The officer in Maestas

"pulled alongside" defendant Maestas' car; Officer Hurst blocked
Appellant Jackson's car.
The officer in Maestas may have been legitimately concerned
about a preventable, imminent hazard, an allegedly intoxicated party
"sitting in the driver's seat with the motor running."

Jackson, by

comparison, was not driving and presented no articulable hazard.
Maestas identified himself.

Officer Hurst already knew Jackson's

identity.
In sum, Officer Hurst acted unreasonably in failing to
recognize the more prudent alternatives.
blocked Appellant's car.
parking lot.

First, he should not have

There were other empty spaces in the

Second, he should not have repeatedly asked for

identification when he already knew Jackson's identity.

Third, in

contrast to the implications argued by the State (T. 45), Officer
Hurst was not restricted in what he could do once Jackson parked his
car.

Hurst still could have radioed dispatch for the license plate

check without questioning Jackson.

It is clear that Hurst had no

grounds for detaining Jackson and his subsequent discovery of the
suspended driver's license was fortuitous.

All of Officer Hurst's

subsequent actions were tainted by the illegal seizure of Jackson's
car and the detention of Jackson's person.
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The controlled

substances found on Jackson's person must be suppressed.

Cf.

People v. Bello. 45 Cal. App. 3rd 970, 119 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1975)
(subsequent action of an officer in shining his light in a
defendant's car, revealing the butt of a gun was improper, for "once
the officer had seen and talked to defendant and realized he was not
intoxicated as the officer initially believed, the officer had no
legitimate reason for detaining him further or for pursuing any
further investigation of him"); State v. Chatton, 468 N.E.2d 1237
(Ohio 1984).

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
convictions and remand this case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this ^Z>

day of March, 1990.
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